John Bolton
Iran, unfortunately, has grown stronger from the recent Israel-Hamas hostilities.
Despite media concentration on last week’s cease-fire, the real focal point is still the invisible Middle Eastern struggle for strategic advantage. There, Iran was already gaining ground, as the International Atomic Energy Agency reported on Nov. 16: Tehran’s extensive nuclear program continues its rapid progress, and it is still stonewalling IAEA inspectors. There is no doubt where Iran is headed.
The mullahs’ priority isn’t the Israel-Palestinian relationship, but whether Israel has the will and the capability to attack Iran’s nuclear-weapons program. Thus, despite Hamas’ terrorist aggression, launching over 1,500 rockets against Israel’s civilian population, Tehran’s central concern was the small number of Fajr-5 missiles targeted on Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.
EPA
Getting set to shoot at Israeli jets: Iranian soldiers prep a new surface-to-air missile for launch in week-long war games this month.
These launches confirm what has long been suspected, namely that Iran had armed Hamas (as it has armed Hezbollah terrorists in Lebanon) with longer-range missiles. And the November clashes provided a combat environment for Iran to test-fire the Fajr-5s from Gaza.
True, Israel’s Iron Dome missile-defense system performed extremely well, a palpable reminder to Americans (especially to President Obama, a long-term opponent of national missile defense for the United States) of the importance of this capability. But Iran also learned a good deal about Iron Dome — and in the never-ceasing struggle between offense and defense, will be better prepared for having had this “dry run” against Israeli defenses.
How will Iran retaliate if its nuclear-weapons facilities are struck pre-emptively? It has several options, including closing the Strait of Hormuz or directly attacking Israel, but its most likely response is indirect. With terrorist allies in place in both Lebanon and Gaza, Tehran is in effect positioned behind Israeli lines, encircling the tiny country and making it much harder to defend.
The Israeli air force can’t be in three places at once, attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities while also trying to suppress missile attacks from both Lebanon’s Bekaa valley and Gaza. And given the inevitable losses Israel will suffer over Iran, Israel’s air assets could be stretched beyond their limits.
Thus, Iran’s ability to inflict unacceptable casualties on Israeli civilians via its terror proxies, all the while maintaining at least a shred of deniability for such attacks, is a powerful element in any Israeli government’s calculation whether to strike Iran pre-emptively.
Have a comment on this PostOpinion column? Send it in to LETTERS@NYPOST.COM!